To prepare for the planned Contained Firing Facility at the LLNL Site 300, we investigated various multilayered shrapnel protection schemes to minimize the amount of material used in shielding. As a result of testing, we found that two pieces of 1-in.-thick mild steel plate provide adequate general-purpose protection from shrapnel generated by normal hydrodynamic and cylinder shots at Bunker 801.
Introduction rectangular, reinforced-concrete firing chamber lined with steel plates for shrapnel protection. Figure 1 is an mist's conception of the planned Contained Firing Facility at the U N L Site300. The Conceptual Design Report' requircs that a typical wall section consist of 4 feet of reinforced concrete followed by a 1-in. steel pressure liner and two layers of2-h-thick steel armor plate. of shrapnel generated by hydrotest experiments at Bunker 801. The philosophy was to start with minimumthickness mild steel plates and work upward, increasing plate thickness as necessary. Multilayer plate technology was selected that uses air spaces to separate steel plates. Moreover, because it was desired to determine damagc caused by shrapnel, the steel plates were positioned to minimize the damage from blast effects and maximize the damage from shrapnel.
To obtain shrapnel with realistic fragment velocities and sizes, the tests were performed as "add on" experiments to actual hydrodynamic and cylinder tests. Because of required diagnostics on these shots, the stecl test plates could not always be positioned in the path of worst-case shrapnel, but it is believed that most of the worst-Cast fragments have been sampled. This report describes nine shrapnel tegs, including test configurations, comparisons of measllrcd versus calculated penetration and perforation results, and recommendations for general-purpose shrapnel protection for the planned Contained Firing Facility at Site 300.
b jectives
The Contained Firing Facility, which is planned to replace open-air testing at Bunker 801, consists of a large
The purpose of this testing was to experimentplly subject various shrapnel protection schemes to normal types ToTupport the proposed Contained Firing FaTility, the shrapnelprotection scheme must:
Allow no damage to the pmsure liner. Minimize fabrication costs. Emphasize versatility for installation and use. Afford easy repair and low maintenance. Figure 2, a typical configumtion of the test block, shows the large reinforced-concrete block, the pressure liner, and the multilayered shrapnel protection plates. The large reinforced-concrete block was used to simulate the wall of the Contained Firing Chamber and provide backing and support for the steel pressure liner. The shrapnel mitigation plates Nos. 2 and 3 were spaced 2 in. away from the pressure liner and from each other. The spacing or "air-gap" between plates was maintained by welded-on bosses on the pressure liner and on plate No. 2. The plates were then bolted to each other with l-in. 8UNC A307-grade bolts and torqued to 250 ft-lb. Mild steel was used instead of armor plate for all the tests because it has roughly 85% of the perforation resistance2 of armor plate at less than half the cost. Most of the shrapnel-producing experiments were from the fragmentation of copper or steel cylinders filled high explosives. Figure 4 shows a typical cylinder shot (Test Wo. 4) just befare detonating the explosive. Thc tests presented in this report were considered "add on" experiments to the hydrodynamic and cylinder cxplosivc . Time of the tests (Nos. 1.5, and 6) were not simple cylinder shots from a shrapnel generating standpoint, but produced damage representative of normal hydrodynamic shots -that are typically performed at the LLNL Site Test No. 6 produced a shaped-charge metal jet that is usually very difficult to protect against with generalpurpose shrapnel protection. It was found that local shielding placed near the point of jet formation significantly reduced full development of the jet and its damage potential. Figure 7 shows a large dent in plate No. 3-approximately 1 inch in diameter and 1.25 inches deep-after the shot was shielded locally with plate glass. The methodology for shrapnel protection design was to start with a minimal design (1/2-in. mild steel plates) and increase the plate thickness as necessary. The goal was KI achieve a balance between deformation caused by blast and pefforation caused by shrapnel versus material cost and ease of handling. By increasing plate thickness, it was found that a reasonable, minimal shrapnel shield consisted of two layers of 1-in. mild steel plate separated by a 241-1. air gap. As shown in Table 1 , the final design with this configuration (Tests 3 and 5 to 8) provided good protection because there were no perforations of plate No. 2, and bcndiiig deformation caused by the blast was acceptable. Figures 8,9 , and 10 show the effects of copper shrapnel on a test block of the final design. The wmst-caSe shrapnel came from Test No. 8 which consisted of% %in. steel cylinder with a wall thickness of 0.8 in. =maximum fragment weight was calculated to be approximately 1 pound with a velocity of 42OO fvs. The last shrapnel protection test (No. 9) in this series was an expesent to access the integrity of a protection housing for a new radiographic diagnostic called the gamma ray camera. Figure 12 shows an overall view of the protection housing with a 4-in.-thick mild-steel shrapnel protection plate in Front of the assembly. This plate was used as a wirness plate, instead of the multilayered test block, to observe the damage to a much thicker shrapnel protection shield. The shrapnel-producing charge for Test No. 9 was a C4 explosive, 10-in. in diameter by 13.25 in. long, cased with a 3/8-in.-thick mild steel cylinder. This particular charge was designed to simulate the worst-case blast and shrapnel of close-up hydrodynamic experiments called core punch shots. Figures 13 and 14 show close-ups of the shrapnel patterns and the depth of penetration from Test No. 9. compare and to make recommendations for general purpose shrapnel shielding for the Contained Firing Facility. The calculation methodology that was used is demonsated below using the parameters from a single test (Test #7). The penetration calculations for all of the tests are given in Appendix B and a summary of these results is prescnted in Table 2 .
Test Descriptions

Testing Results
The penetration caculations were performed as a two step process.'First a calculation of the shrapnel mass and velocity was performed. The penetrations were then calculated by using three accepted but different formulas. Dut to the fact that penetration formulas are generally empirically based and were derived for differing regimes, three different formulas were used to assure a greater confidence in predicted penetration. 
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The penetration depth (p) of the case fragment into the shrapnel protection plate is calculated by three different methodologies for comparison. The penetration formulas used are: 1. Demarre. By SeUing residual velocity equal to zero (V,= 0; no perforation) and rearranging terms yields the THOR quation for minimum shield thickness to prevent perforation:
1
Becausethe original THOR equations were for steel projectiles (fragments), the calculated fragment wcight, Wf, was modified by the ratio of the densities of actual fragment material, pr, to that of steel, ps:
Thc target specific material constants for mild steel &om Table 6 For Test No. 7:
Because L/D c 1, the fist term in the penetration equation, associated with long rod penetrators, is insignificant and can be neglected to yield:
The kinetic energy of the fragment El is given by which gives a penetration depth of Table 2 provides a summary of results using all three calculation methodologies compared to the measured penetration depths. Tests 1,5, and 6 were jet producing tests and did not produce shrapnel. 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
These recommendations are good for general purpose shrapnel protection and are based on the assumption that local primary shielding is provided on a shot-by-shot basis. This assumption allows for conservatism and redundancy.
An analysis of the optimal air gap between plates is not provided. The 2-in. air gap between plates was based on earlier LLNL work.2
Provide a 1-in. mild-steel intermediate plate (plate No. 2 in Fig. 1 ) for redundancy and safety. A 2411. air gap is recommended between all plates (plates 1,2, and 3).
A minimum of 1/2 in. of mild steel should be providcd for the pressure liner (plate No. 1) or other weldable, easily installed liner.
A 1-in. minimum of mild steel should be used for the innermost chamber plate (plate No 3 of Fig. 1 ) to prevent bending and minimize penetration and plate replacement.
Seal or exclude high-explosive (HE) particles or other contaminated material that might become lodged between the plates, under bolt heads, and in bolt threads. If this precaution is not taken, safety problems could be encountered during disassembly and re-assembly.
Measured shrapnel penetration depths compare quite favorably with calculational techniques in common use and provide a reference for shrapnel protection design in a contained chamber. Specifically, the calculational method of Gerhing and Christman provided the best overall match to the measured data for fragment sizes and velocities encountered in the testing.
A-I
Appendix A. Test records, Nos. 1 to 8. . Two edge hits on plate #3 -3/4" and 1".
Very slight bend in plate #3 caused by blast.
Assembly would be reusable without changing plates. We probably recelved Impacts from the most damaging fragments. The assembly may have been partially shielded. We may have received fragments from the waste. No damage to plates X1 or t2.
Test Record
-Explosive charge was covered with also attenuated the impact. 2" glass plate on surface face of hemisphere. Other turning mirrors may have * Since the test, we have learned that placing glass close to the explosive charge has a much greater effect on reducing the jet than placing the glass near the block assembly. Therefore, the effect of glass plates near the blodc assembly alone cannot be determined.
The explosive charge generated a jet effect and did not produce shrapnel.
In our experiment. the total effect of the glass (explosive charge face, turning mirrors, and plate glass) successfuUy protected our block assembly.
Test Record No. 6
A-7 Upper-right bolt head destroyed. Had to be removed with hammer, chisel, and channel lock pliers.
Bolts holding plate #3 were at reduced toque. Damaged bolt was loose.
Bolts holding plate #2 were still tight but at approximately 200 ft.llb torque. They were retorqued to 250 ftAb.
This was a very successful test. Plate #1 received no impacts.
Plate #3 recelved impacts from Tests # 5, 6, and 7. It has now been replaced with a new plate.
Test Record No. 7
A-8 Rate X2 was not perforated. It did receive a large dent when impacted by shrapnel from plate C3. The plate was distorted by 1.1" at the edge and tapered toward center bolt.
Plate t 3 received 20 majar impacts: however, only two were perforations. One perforation was quite large and irrpaicted plate X2 severely.
A 0.5-in.-thidc granite sheet was placed 23 in. in front of one-half of the impact blodc This action was taken to test the shrapnel mitigation potential of various materials. We are currently considering glass, ceramics, and granite. By chance, that half of the biodc received the major impacts. The performance of the granke sheet is Inconclusive.
Although the witness block assembly was impacted by large shrapnef pieces, the two 1 -in. steel plates successfully protected the one-hatf-In. pressure liner plate X I on the block face. ~ Test Record No. 8 
